Revert "PHP Rebuild"

This reverts commit 2ef3654841.

src/lib/utils/__tests__/safe-redirect.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { safeRedirectPath } from "../safe-redirect";
+
+describe("safeRedirectPath", () => {
+  it("accepts a plain internal path", () => {
+    expect(safeRedirectPath("/book/details", "/home")).toBe("/book/details");
+  });
+
+  it("falls back for null/undefined/empty input", () => {
+    expect(safeRedirectPath(null, "/home")).toBe("/home");
+    expect(safeRedirectPath(undefined, "/home")).toBe("/home");
+    expect(safeRedirectPath("", "/home")).toBe("/home");
+  });
+
+  it("rejects protocol-relative URLs", () => {
+    expect(safeRedirectPath("//evil.com", "/home")).toBe("/home");
+  });
+
+  it("rejects absolute URLs to another host", () => {
+    expect(safeRedirectPath("https://evil.com/phish", "/home")).toBe("/home");
+    expect(safeRedirectPath("http://evil.com", "/home")).toBe("/home");
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a path not starting with a single slash", () => {
+    expect(safeRedirectPath("book/details", "/home")).toBe("/home");
+    expect(safeRedirectPath("javascript:alert(1)", "/home")).toBe("/home");
+  });
+});

src/lib/utils/cn.ts

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+import { clsx, type ClassValue } from "clsx";
+import { twMerge } from "tailwind-merge";
+
+/**
+ * Merge Tailwind class lists safely — later classes win over earlier ones
+ * for the same utility group (e.g. `cn("px-4", condition && "px-6")`).
+ */
+export function cn(...inputs: ClassValue[]) {
+  return twMerge(clsx(inputs));
+}

src/lib/utils/safe-redirect.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+/**
+ * Validates a caller-supplied return path (a `callbackUrl` query param,
+ * a booking-draft continuation target) is a safe, internal, relative
+ * path before it's ever used in a redirect — see the brief's "Accept
+ * only safe internal return paths. Prevent open redirects." Auth.js's
+ * own `signIn()`/`redirectTo` already restricts to same-origin
+ * internally, but this is checked explicitly rather than relied on
+ * implicitly, since it guards a value that reached this code from a URL
+ * query string, not from a trusted internal source.
+ */
+export function safeRedirectPath(path: string | null | undefined, fallback: string): string {
+  if (!path) return fallback;
+  // Must start with exactly one "/" — rejects "//evil.com" (protocol-relative),
+  // "https://evil.com", and "javascript:..." in one check.
+  if (!path.startsWith("/") || path.startsWith("//")) return fallback;
+  if (path.includes("://")) return fallback;
+  return path;
+}