1. Summary of changes Password auth → email OTP, everywhere it existed for the tenant/business app: sign-in, customer self-registration (/register), staff-invitation acceptance, and the installer's administrator step. Flow is always: email → 6-digit code emailed → code entered → session created, via one shared service (otp.service.ts) reused by every entry point. NextChair Manager's own auth was not touched — this only affects tenant-side (business admin/staff/customer) authentication, per the spec's explicit instruction. Installer improvements: Step 2 (Administrator) now asks only Name + Email + optional Phone, verified inline via the same OTP widget (no redirect). Step 3 (Business Details) pre-fills Business Name from the Manager-provisioned BUSINESS_NAME, shows the booking URL (NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL) as a read-only info box instead of asking for it, and has a distinctly-labeled "Business Website (optional)" field with copy clarifying it's not the booking URL. Installation cannot complete with an unverified admin email — enforced server-side (finalizeOtp runs inside the same DB transaction as user/business creation), not just trusted from client state. A mid-wizard refresh still can't create duplicate admins or partial records — that property was preserved by design, not incidentally. 2. Prisma/database changes New EmailOtp model (email as PK — one row per address, so a new request naturally invalidates the previous code): codeHash, purpose, expiresAt, attempts, verifiedAt, consumedAt, timestamps. Only a bcrypt hash of the code is ever stored. User.passwordHash — unchanged schema (already nullable), just annotated as deprecated. No destructive migration; historical rows are untouched. Migration: prisma/migrations/20260905190022_email_otp_authentication — adds EmailOtp only. Generated and applied against throwaway containers only; the real next-chair-mysql production database was never touched (confirmed not even running on this host during this session). 3. New environment variables None required for production. One new variable, E2E_TEST_MODE, exists purely for the Playwright suite (set only in playwright.config.ts's webServer.env) — it unlocks a /api/test/otp-code debug endpoint and bypasses OTP rate limiting so the same seeded users can sign in dozens of times across one test run. It must never be set on a real deployment; nothing in the app sets it anywhere else. 4. Email delivery configuration Nothing new to configure. OTP emails reuse the existing EmailProvider abstraction and EMAIL_PROVIDER env var exactly as configured today — console in dev (prints to server logs), brevo in production via the same SMTP credentials already documented. The OTP email is a new template (otp-email.ts) sent directly (bypassing the async notification/cron pipeline, since a 10-minute-expiry code can't wait for a delivery retry loop). 5. Migration considerations for existing users/installations Existing users lose password sign-in — the only way to authenticate now is email OTP. There is no in-app fallback; this is an intentional, sharp cutover. If existing customers/staff/admins need advance notice, that's a business/communications decision outside this change. No account data is deleted or migrated — passwordHash rows are simply never read for auth anymore. prisma/seed.ts / scripts/ensure-super-admin.ts still set a passwordHash for seeded dev users — harmless and vestigial now, not cleaned up (flagging it rather than touching seed data silently). Installations already completed are unaffected; only new installer runs go through the OTP admin-verification step. 6. Files changed New: src/lib/auth/otp.service.ts — the core requestOtp/verifyOtp/finalizeOtp service src/lib/auth/__tests__/otp.service.integration.test.ts src/services/notifications/templates/otp-email.ts src/features/auth/components/otp-code-step.tsx — shared code-entry UI src/features/auth/actions/request-sign-in-otp.ts src/app/api/test/otp-code/route.ts — e2e-only, gated on E2E_TEST_MODE prisma/migrations/20260905190022_email_otp_authentication/ Modified — auth core: prisma/schema.prisma, src/auth.ts, src/features/auth/schemas.ts Modified — sign-in/register/invitations: sign-in-form.tsx, register.ts, register-form.tsx, accept-invitation.ts, accept-invitation-form.tsx, staff-invitation.service.ts Modified — installer: installer.service.ts, schema.ts, install.ts, install-wizard.tsx, install/page.tsx, installer.service.integration.test.ts Modified — email / e2e infra: console-email-provider.ts, playwright.config.ts, e2e/helpers.ts, and the four e2e/*.spec.ts files (dropped the now-unused password argument from every signIn() call). 7. Verification performed npx tsc --noEmit, npm run lint, npm test (276 unit) — all clean. npm run test:integration (207 tests, throwaway DB) — includes 11 new OTP-service tests and a rewritten installer suite; a genuine race condition in requestOtp (concurrent requests for a brand-new email double-hitting the upsert's create branch) was caught and fixed here. Full npm run test:e2e against a fresh throwaway database: 36/37 passed. The one failure (owner-journeys "opening hours conflict" test) is a pre-existing, auth-unrelated ordering flake — appointment-count ambiguity from earlier tests' bookings — not something this change touches or introduced. Live manual verification in-browser: existing seeded customer sign-in via OTP; new customer registration via OTP (session created, landed on Home); installer wizard end-to-end through Step 3, confirming email-verification gating, Business Name pre-population from BUSINESS_NAME, and the read-only Booking URL / distinct Business Website fields. All throwaway Docker containers/DBs used for this work have been removed; the real production database was never touched.
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@@ -1,39 +1,38 @@
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import { z } from "zod";
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/**
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* Single source of truth for auth form shapes — shared between the client
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* form (react-hook-form + zodResolver) and the server action / Credentials
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* `authorize()` callback, so validation never drifts between the two.
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* Single source of truth for auth form shapes — shared between client
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* forms (react-hook-form + zodResolver) and their server actions. Every
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* flow here is now email-OTP-based (see src/lib/auth/otp.service.ts) —
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* there is no password field anywhere in this file.
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*/
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export const signInSchema = z.object({
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const otpCode = z
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.string()
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.trim()
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.regex(/^\d{6}$/, "Enter the 6-digit code");
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export const emailOnlySchema = z.object({
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email: z.email("Enter a valid email address"),
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password: z.string().min(1, "Password is required"),
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});
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export type SignInInput = z.infer<typeof signInSchema>;
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export type EmailOnlyInput = z.infer<typeof emailOnlySchema>;
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export const registerSchema = z
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.object({
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firstName: z.string().trim().min(1, "First name is required"),
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lastName: z.string().trim().min(1, "Last name is required"),
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email: z.email("Enter a valid email address"),
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phone: z.string().trim().optional().or(z.literal("")),
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password: z.string().min(8, "Password must be at least 8 characters"),
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confirmPassword: z.string(),
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})
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.refine((data) => data.password === data.confirmPassword, {
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message: "Passwords don't match",
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path: ["confirmPassword"],
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});
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export type RegisterInput = z.infer<typeof registerSchema>;
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/** Step 2 of sign-in — email is re-sent alongside the code (not trusted from any earlier request) so a stale/forged form can't verify a code against a different address than the one it was requested for. */
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export const signInVerifySchema = z.object({
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email: z.email("Enter a valid email address"),
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code: otpCode,
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});
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export type SignInVerifyInput = z.infer<typeof signInVerifySchema>;
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export const acceptInvitationSchema = z
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.object({
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password: z.string().min(8, "Password must be at least 8 characters"),
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confirmPassword: z.string(),
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})
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.refine((data) => data.password === data.confirmPassword, {
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message: "Passwords don't match",
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path: ["confirmPassword"],
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});
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export type AcceptInvitationInput = z.infer<typeof acceptInvitationSchema>;
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export const registerRequestSchema = z.object({
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firstName: z.string().trim().min(1, "First name is required"),
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lastName: z.string().trim().min(1, "Last name is required"),
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email: z.email("Enter a valid email address"),
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phone: z.string().trim().optional().or(z.literal("")),
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});
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export type RegisterRequestInput = z.infer<typeof registerRequestSchema>;
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export const registerVerifySchema = registerRequestSchema.extend({
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code: otpCode,
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});
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export type RegisterVerifyInput = z.infer<typeof registerVerifySchema>;
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